New York State Court of Claims

New York State Court of Claims

CAMPAGNA v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK, #2001-017-714, Claim No. 98599


State held liable for well contamination resulting from salt stored at Department of Transportation facility.
Case Information
JOHN and CANDIDA CAMPAGNA and JAMES and LINNETTE EVANGELISTI The court has deleted the unnecessary reference to the Department of Transportation, a State agency without independent legal existence, from the caption.
Claimant short name:
Footnote (claimant name) :

Footnote (defendant name) :
The court has deleted the unnecessary reference to the Department of Transportation, a State agency without independent legal existence, from the caption.
Third-party claimant(s):

Third-party defendant(s):

Claim number(s):
Motion number(s):

Cross-motion number(s):

Claimant's attorney:
Defendant's attorney:
ELIOT SPITZER, Attorney Generalby: MICHAEL ROSAS, Esq., Assistant Attorney General
Third-party defendant's attorney:

Signature date:
June 15, 2001
New City

Official citation:

Appellate results:

See also (multicaptioned case)

John and Candida Campagna and James and Linnette Evangelisti reside in the Town of East Fishkill (Dutchess County) at 7 Prentiss Drive and 9 Prentiss Drive respectively, just east of the Taconic State Parkway. They allege that the water supply in their residences has become contaminated by salt which has leached into the groundwater and that such salt has its origin in a Department of Transportation (DOT) storage facility located just west of the parkway. The claim contains causes of action sounding in de facto condemnation, negligence, trespass and nuisance. The trial was bifurcated and only the issue of liability will be determined herein.

Mr. Evangelisti testified that he and his wife purchased their home, a single-family three-bedroom house on one and one-half acres of land, in July 1992 and that they have lived there continuously since then with their two children. He stated that in mid-1995, he and his family noticed that their water, which comes from a well located on their property, tasted unusual, and they asked the county health department and the State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) to so some testing. According to Mr. Evangelisti, subsequent to the testing, the DEC directed the DOT to (1) provide bottled water, (2) build a salt dome in which to store their salt, and (3) devise and implement a long-term remediation plan for his well and the Campagna and Luzzi[1]
wells. He advised that the first two of these items were accomplished (as of the date of his testimony, he continued to be supplied with bottled water by DOT), but the third was not, and he described a three-year series of letters and conversations in which he attempted to have the two State agencies remedy the problem.
Mr. Evangelisti prepared a summary of the results of monthly testing for his and the Campagna wells in graph form (Exhibit 1). The graph plots the results of tests for chloride and sodium in the Evangelisti well from June 1995 through January 2000, the Campagna well from September 1995 through January 2000, and the Luzzi well from June 1996 through October 1996.

According to Mr. Evangelisti, a DOT hydrologist named Mauricio Roma visited his property in the summer of 1996 and conducted a series of tests and Mr. Roma told him at that time that the salt contamination could have had its source in the DOT facility, or in the Evangelisti's septic system, or in intentional chlorination of the well to treat bacterial contamination.

Mr. Evangelisti testified that the DOT salt storage facility was built in the fall or early winter of 1996 and that he had observed piles of sand, salt and sand/salt mixtures stored on the property, outside of the structure, during the winters of 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999.

Although they use the DOT-supplied bottled water for drinking, the Evangelisti family is able to use their well water for other purposes, including sometimes for cooking, but he described the situation as "difficult and frustrating, and in some respects, embarrassing" (Vol. I, 38).[2]
Mr. Evangelisti is concerned about investing in home improvements because he fears that he won't be able to sell the home "for what would have been a normal market value if I had had good water" (id.) After three years of attempting to have the State of New York resolve the problem, he and his wife began to feel that DOT was not serious about doing so and they decided to file a claim for damages
On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited that the Evangelistis have a water softener, which utilizes salt, and a pool, which contains chlorinated water, on their property.

Candida Campagna testified that she and her husband purchased their home at 7 Prentiss Drive in December 1989 and that in August 1995, they realized that there was a serious problem with their water and stopped using it for cooking and drinking. She and her husband did not interact directly with the county health department, DOT or DEC because they felt that Mr. Evangelisti was taking care of that for them as well. She stated that the DOT storage facility, which she estimated was 100 yards from her property, was constructed in the fall of 1996 and that during that and subsequent winters, she saw mounds of salt stored on the property, inside and outside the structure

Mr. and Mrs. Campagna indicated that they, like the Evangelistis, have a water softener and a backyard pool.
Claimants' expert witness, John Conrad, a ground water geologist with a Master's degree in geology from the University of Delaware, was retained in November 1998 to analyze the laboratory data, inspect the landscape including the claimants' property and the DOT facility, and try to determine the Source of the sodium chloride contamination that was being found in the Prentiss Lane neighborhood. Mr. Conrad indicated that the State standard for potable water is 250 mg. of chloride per liter (mg./l) and that the "guidance level" (Vol. II, 88) for sodium (there is no actual standard) is 270 mg/l except for people on severely sodium restricted diets, in which case the recommended level is 20 mg/l. He noted that testing of water taken from two wells located on the DOT property in January and March 1996 indicated levels well in excess of these guidelines (chloride ranging from 1975 to 3500 mg/l and sodium ranging from 675 to 1760 mg/l)(Exhibit 2).

The data for claimants' wells, summarized on the Exhibit 1 graphs[3]
, indicated levels in excess of the guidelines, sometimes far in excess, generally from June or July of each year through the end of the year, and then levels below the limits until the following summer. Mr. Conrad's conclusion was:
based on the amount of sodium chloride contamination in the ground water beneath the DOT facility, the amount of sodium and chloride detected in the affected wells across the parkway, and because there's the interconnection through bedrock fractures between those two properties, that the source of sodium and chloride in the residential wells is the DOT facility. (Vol. II, 99).
He indicated that salt stored in uncovered piles will dissolve easily and percolate through the soil into bedrock fractures where it travels, after separating into discrete sodium and chloride molecules, throughout the ground water. He also stated that the sodium and chloride molecules will travel at different rates of speed because chloride is less adherent to soil particles than is sodium and therefore is more free-flowing and that the levels of both chemicals fluctuate up and down because of seasonal weather fluctuations.
Mr. Conrad opined that the levels of chloride found in the claimants' wells was far in excess of what could be explained by the discharge of chlorinated pool water from the claimants' swimming pools and he similarly felt that the claimants' water softeners would not explain the high levels of sodium and chloride. He found no explanation in the surrounding area, other than the unprotected storage of salt at the DOT facility, about 270 feet from the claimants' property, for the levels found in their well water.

Defense counsel pointed out to Mr. Conrad that the data for claimants' wells (which are 305 and 330 feet deep) sometimes reflected wide monthly fluctuations in chloride and sodium levels, and sometimes the sodium level was higher than the chloride level, a phenomenon that was not seen in either of the two DOT wells or the Luzzi well (which is 405 feet deep). The witness's explanation was that "the processes that act on sodium and chloride in the ground would be different from well to well" (
id., 133).
Patrick Ferracane, an Environmental Program Specialist with the DEC's Division of Water, testified that he first became involved with the Prentiss Drive situation in November 1995, after the department had received complaints from homeowners about salty water, and that after identifying the DOT facility as a possible source, his department required DOT to provide the affected homeowners with bottled water, build a "proper salt storage facility" (
id., 183), and prepare a long-term well remediation plan (see, Exhibit 78). He indicated that the first two of these items was accomplished but the third was not, and that his department had not performed any "further detailed investigation" of the situation beyond its initial determination that the DOT facility might be implicated in the contamination of claimants' water (id., 186).
With respect to the issue of the source of the sodium and chloride contamination of claimants' wells, the dispositive factual issue in this bifurcated liability trial, the following excerpts from internal DOT memoranda received at trial are instructive:
March 19, 1996: "The yard has two uncovered piles: a salt pile and what appears to be a sand and salt mix pile. The piles are on a concrete pad which is partially covered with brine. I also observed salt spilled outside the concrete pad. I suggest to improve our housekeeping practices." (Exhibit 28)

August 16, 1996: "It appears that well contamination has resulted from inadequate salt storage and salt spillage at the subject yard ***." (Exhibit 43)

October 9, 1996:"We have a problem in the region with an apparent pollution of private wells from a maintenance facility. The Route 52 yard in Hopewell Junction, a sub-station of residency 8-3, apparently has caused three (3) wells to become contaminated, with one of the three having high amounts of chlorides present ***." (Exhibit 49)
On April 17, 1998 William Mactiernan, the director of the DOT's Legal Services Division, wrote to Mr. Evangelisti and made the following points:
1) That salt contamination was first reported in 1995 and that since the DOT had an uncovered salt pile in the immediate vicinity, it was suspected that such was the source of the contamination, resulting in DOT supplying bottled water to the affected households and in DOT constructing a weather-proof salt storage dome.

2) That between July 1996 and June 1997, the levels of salt in the Campagna and Evangelisti wells "dropped precipitously" and stabilized at acceptable levels.

3) That in July 1997, the Campagna and Evangelisti wells experienced a steep increase in salt contamination, increases that were, in the DOT's view "unexpected" and "significantly different from that which would have been expected had the salt emanated from the highway maintenance area," resulting in the Department's conclusion that its facility was "not the likely source" of the contamination reflected in the 1997 testing.

4) That for the first four months of 1998, sodium and chloride levels in the Campagna and Evangelisti wells had returned to acceptable levels.[4]

5) That although DOT would continue to test the water and provide bottled drinking water, there were no plans to take any additional action. (Exhibit 108).
The instant claim was filed on July 9, 1998. It is, of course, claimants' burden of proof to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the contamination of their wells had its source in the salt that was "inadequately" stored on defendant's property, or, stated another way, that it is more likely than not that such was the case.
Mauricio Roma Hernandez, a DOT hydrogeologist who holds a Master's degree in geology from SUNY Albany, became involved in early 1996 after DOT received the 1995 test results for the Campagna, Evangelisti and Luzzi wells. He stated that the DOT thought there was a possibility that the elevated sodium and chloride levels found on those three properties were the result of contamination from the DOT yard, and that the policy in such cases is to initiate a more comprehensive investigation, which in this case consisted of monthly monitoring of the relevant chemical levels in the claimants' well water as well as water from other properties in the area, and to supply bottled water to the affected homeowners

The thrust of Mr. Hernandez's testimony was that the elevated sodium chloride levels found in the Evangelisti and Campagna well water was not the result of the salt stored at the DOT yard and the data upon which he based that conclusion was summarized and reflected on Exhibit I, a detailed map of the area which contains (1) a depiction of where in the area elevated levels were found in May, 2000 (an area that did not include the claimants' properties) and the chloride/sodium ratios found at those sites, (2) a summary of the chloride/sodium ratios for the claimants' properties from September 1995 through May, 2000, and (3) the test results from two residences somewhat removed from any possible contamination from the DOT site. The exhibit showed what was referred to as the "chloride plume" as of May, 2000 (the area which the defendant apparently concedes was contaminated by salt from the DOT yard, which includes the Luzzi property). Chloride levels in this area ranged from 250 mg/l to 1500 mg/l. The claimants' properties were not included in this area because, in May 2000, the chloride levels were less than 250 mg/l. Mr. Hernandez pointed out that the chloride to sodium ratios in the "plume" area ranged generally from 1.7 to 2.5 (although on the Luzzi property the ratio ranged from 1.6 to 3.4) and that the ratios on the claimants' properties ranged from 0.2 to 5.1 (for the Campagna well) and from 0.1 to 7.7 (for the Evangelisti well). He described these results as "a very abnormal chemistry in the ground water, especially when all the wells are installed in the same geological formation" (Vol. III, 282).

In stating the chloride to sodium (Cl/Na) ratio for a given water sample, a reading of less than 1 indicates more sodium than chloride. Mr. Hernandez indicated that, out of 35 water samples taken at each of the Campagna and Evangelisti wells, the sodium was higher than the chloride 13 times at the Campagna well and seven times at the Evangelisti well. Asked his opinion as to the source of the excess sodium, he stated: "I don't know where it is coming from *** for the Evangelisti well, part of it, it comes from the softener" (
id., 297). He also offered the opinion that "there is a good possibility that pool discharged water entered the area of influence of the pumping well" (id., 315),
On cross examination, Mr. Hernandez was led through a somewhat more in-depth discussion of the Cl/Na ratio data. For the months of July through December 1997, when the levels of both chemicals were extremely elevated in the Campagna well, the Cl/Na ration was 5.1 for July, but ranged between 1.4 and 2.3 for the remaining five months, a ratio that was consistent with what Mr. Hernandez had testified would be expected to be found in a well that was contaminated by salt from the DOT yard. He agreed that chloride ions travel through ground water faster than sodium ions, and he conceded that these 1997 findings (including the July "spike") were consistent with and could be explained by that fact. He also agreed that for the months of 1998 when the Campagna well showed elevated levels (July through December), the Cl/Na ratios were within the range of what was found throughout the area that he conceded had been contaminated by the DOT salt. In fact, while the Campagna ratios are reflected on Exhibit I as ranging from 0.2 to 5.1, the 5.1 reading was a one-time, anomalous result, with the next highest ratio being 3.1 and all of the rest being less than 3. Similarly, for the Evangelisti well, after a 7.7 ratio in July 1997, the ratios were either 1.2 or 2.4 for the balance of the 1997 contaminated period and for July through December 1998, all of the ratios are within the range of what Mr. Hernandez indicated would be expected.

With respect to the "chloride plume" depicted on Exhibit I, Mr. Hernandez conceded that the Campagna and Evangelisti properties were excluded only because it was, arbitrarily, based on the results for May 2000, a month for which those two wells did not have elevated levels. Had the map been drawn based on testing levels for other months, it would have looked very different, with the claimants' properties included in the "plume."

Mr. Hernandez's opinion – that while the Luzzi well may well have been contaminated by DOT salt, the claimants' wells were not – was seriously undermined when the basis for that opinion was explored. He ultimately described the claimants' wells as "anomalies":
An anomaly is a large fluctuation of the water chemistry where sometimes it may look that the contamination may be coming from the yard. Some other times, it really doesn't. And the data is inconsistent overall *** I want to stress there is a possibility in my opinion that the DOT may be contributing salt to these wells, but within the context of the anomaly, it is very difficult to determine how much, if any, it is affecting because of this anomalous chemistry" (id., 367-368).
As noted above, it was the claimants' burden of proof to establish that it is more likely than not that the salt that was stored on the defendant's property was the source, at least in part, of the contamination found in the claimants' wells. The court finds that claimants met this burden of proof. More problematic is exactly what this finding means in terms of the various causes of action asserted in the claim – i.e., trespass, nuisance, negligence and de facto condemnation – particularly in light of the filing of the claim in July, 1998.
Under New York law, trespass is the intentional invasion of another's property. See Ivancic v. Olmstead, 66 N.Y.2d 349, 352, 497 N.Y.S.2d 326, 488 N.E.2d 72 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1117, 90 L. Ed. 2d 658, 106 S. Ct. 1975 (1986); Phillips v. Sun Oil Co., 307 N.Y. 328, 331, 121 N.E.2d 249 (1954); see also New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1361 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947, 109 L. Ed. 2d 532, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990). To be liable, the trespasser "need not intend or expect the damaging consequences of his intrusion[;]" rather, he need only "intend the act which amounts to or produces the unlawful invasion." Phillips, 307 N.Y. at 331; see, New York State Nat'l Org. for Women, 886 F.2d at 1361. The intrusion itself "must at least be the immediate or inevitable consequence of what [the trespasser] willfully does, or which he does so negligently as to amount to willfulness." Phillips, 307 N.Y. at 331; see also, Ivancic, 66 N.Y.2d at 352. (Scribner v Summers, 84 F.3d 554).
Upon the record before the court, it is clear that the defendant intentionally stored salt on its property, essentially on bare ground, with no protection against the natural and inevitable consequence of such action; i.e., the leaching of salt into the groundwater below its property and thence into the groundwater below neighboring properties.
A private nuisance is "(1) an interference substantial in nature, (2) intentional in origin, (3) unreasonable in character, (4) with a person's property right to use and enjoy land, (5) caused by another's conduct in acting or failing to act" (
Copart Indus. v Consolidated Edison, 41 NY2d 564, 570).[5] The distinction between trespass and nuisance in cases such as the one before the court is murky. Prosser, after noting that "[t]here is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the word ‘nuisance'," goes on to state that "the line between trespass and nuisance has become wavering and uncertain"[6] (Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 5th ed., 616, 622). Professor Dan Dobbs suggests that trespass requires an actual invasion of the plaintiff's property by the wrongdoer while nuisance is the appropriate cause of action where polluting materials flow from one person's property to another, but he then candidly observes that "[s]ome contemporary cases have been impatient with these distinctions" (Dobbs, The Law of Torts, 2d ed., 1322).[7]
While some academic commentators, and courts, might well characterize the facts of the instant claim as a nuisance and not a trespass, since defendant's employees did not enter onto claimants' properties and deposit salt thereon, the distinction is of no moment to our analysis here. Regardless of the varying judicial characterizations of the degree and nature of the intent necessary for a trespass, or a nuisance[8]
, it is clear that the conduct of the defendant was intentional in that salt was knowingly stored in an unprotected manner and such conduct was negligent in that the readily-perceivable risk of percolation into the groundwater was ignored and the relatively undemanding steps involved in protecting against such risk were not taken. These findings establish the "intent" element of each cause of action. Thus, liability has been established.
Whether characterized as sounding in trespass, nuisance or negligence, a claim for damage to property, regardless of whether it is premised on negligent or intentional conduct, must be served and filed within 90 days of the accrual of the claim (Court of Claims Act §§ 10[3], 10[3-b]). A claim accrues when damages are ascertainable, which in this case was sometime in 1995, after the claimants had their water tested, the salt contamination was confirmed by testing and it was first suspected that the DOT yard was the source of the contamination. Nevertheless, claimants' failure to interpose a claim within 90 days of accrual is not fatal to their action, but it does operate to limit the damages that may be recovered to those that were incurred within the 90 days preceding the filing of the claim on July 9, 1998 (
see, e.g., Kulpa v Stewart's Ice Cream, supra, 144 AD2d 205; Waters of Saratoga Springs v State of New York, 116 AD2d 875; Buchanan v State of New York, Ct Cl, Hanifin, J., UID No. 2000-004-011, September 28, 2000)[9]. Since this was a bifurcated trial, the effect of claimants' delay in filing the claim cannot be quantified until the damages portion of the claim is tried.
In their first and fifth causes of action, claimants seek damages for the de facto condemnation of their property. De facto condemnation may be thought of as a trespass taken to the extreme:
The difference between these two types of interference is a matter of degree. A de facto taking occurs when the government has intruded upon a private landholder's property, ousted the owner or otherwise interfered so substantially with the owner's right to use, enjoy or dispose of the property as to amount to a constitutional taking (O'Brien v City of Syracuse, 54 NY2d 353, 357; City of Buffalo v J.W. Clement Co., 28 NY2d 241, 253-255; Stewart v State of New York, 248 AD2d 761; Carr v Town of Fleming, 122 AD2d 540; Village of Tarrytown v Woodland Lake Estates, 97 AD2d 338, 343, appeal and cross-appeal dismissed 63 NY2d 771; Broderick v State of New York, Ct Cl, March 16, 1998 [Claim No. 86781], Patti, J.). A trespass ordinarily entails an invasion or interference that is shorter in duration and less pervasive in scope, or that results in less encompassing destruction or damage (O'Brien v City of Syracuse, supra; Carr v Town of Fleming, supra; Stewart v State of New York, supra; Sassone v Town of Queensbury, 157 AD2d 891). (Partridge v State of New York, Ct Cl, Patti, J., UID No. 2000-013-002, May 13, 2000).
Thus, whether a particular intrusion of a governmental entity onto a claimant's property may be compensated via a tort cause of action or rises to the level of a "taking" is a matter that is based on the severity of the damages sustained. This trial was bifurcated, and the extent of the damages sustained by the claimants was not the subject of the testimony, except peripherally. While it appears doubtful that claimants will be able to establish a de fact condemnation cause of action, it would be unfair to foreclose that possibility until after they have had a chance to fully present their evidence in that regard, at a trial in which damages are at issue, and the disposition of this cause of action must await the damages trial.
Any motions upon which decision had been reserved are hereby denied, and the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment of liability in favor of the claimants in accordance with this decision.

June 15, 2001
New City, New York

Judge of the Court of Claims

[1]Mr. And Mrs. Luzzi have also filed a claim, No. 98677, which is pending.
[2]All such references are to the trial transcript.
[3]Claimant's counsel stipulated that all of the data for the Evangelisti well reflected on Exhibit 1, with the exception of the July 1996 reading, which was well within limits, was taken from an outside water spigot, after the water had been treated by the water softener.
[4]Subsequent testing, reflected on Exhibit 1, showed excessive levels from July through December, 1998, and June through October, 1999, with levels returning to within normal limits in the interval.
[5]The court in Copart Industries noted that "nuisance, as a general term, describes the consequences of conduct, the inconvenience to others, rather than the type of conduct involved" and noted that "negligence is merely one type of conduct which may give rise to a nuisance" [the others being "intentional and unreasonable" or "actionable under the rules governing liability for abnormally dangerous conditions or activities"](41 NY2d 564, 569).
[6]The Copart Industries court distinguished trespass from nuisance by noting that the former redresses invasion of the property owner's interest in "exclusive possession" while the latter protects against invasion of the owner's interest in the "private use and enjoyment" of his/her property (id., 570, 569).

[7]A brief diversion to examine Prosser's "wavering and uncertain" line: In Kulpa v Stewart's Ice Cream (144 AD2d 205 [1988]), involving the leakage of gasoline from underground storage tanks, polluting the water on adjacent property, the Appellate Division, Third Department sustained the cause of action for nuisance (based on negligence) but rejected the cause of action for trespass, reasoning that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a "willful trespass" (id., 207). In State of New York v Fermenta ASC Corp. (238 AD2d 400 [1997]) (pollution of Suffolk County's groundwater by a widely-used herbicide), the Second Department affirmed the dismissal of the nuisance cause of action because there was no showing of intent or negligence, yet allowed the trespass cause of action to proceed simply because defendants' actions (in manufacturing the chemical and directing its use) was substantially certain to result in the pollution of the groundwater. In Hilltop Nyack Corp. v TRMI Holdings (264 AD2d 503 [2d Dept., 1999]), (leakage from underground gasoline storage tank), the trespass cause of action was allowed to proceed because there were triable issues of fact surrounding the allegations of negligence and the nuisance cause of action was also allowed to proceed, without explanation other than citation to Copart Industries, Kulpa, and Drouin v Ridge (209 AD2d 957 [1994]), a Fourth Department case also involving underground gasoline leakage, in which the trespass cause of action was dismissed because there was no indication "that defendant had the requisite willful intent to intrude upon plaintiffs' property" (id., 959) but the nuisance cause of action was allowed to proceed because plaintiffs were "owners and occupants of adjoining land allegedly contaminated by the gasoline spill" (id.) None of these cases center around Professor Dobbs's distinction between actual invasion of another's property as opposed to activity on one property that has effects on another's property (but see, fn. 7, supra , in which the Court of Appeals appears to be making just that distinction), a distinction obviously rooted in vestiges of the old common law writ of "trespass," and which has an interesting analogue in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence centering around whether a physical "trespass" is a necessary component of the constitutional concept of a "search" (see the progression from Olmstead v United States [277 US 438] through Goldman v United States [316 US 129], Silverman v United States [365 US 505], and Katz v United States [389 US 347], and culminating in Kyllo v United States [ __ US __ , 2001 US Lexis 4487, June 11, 2001]).

[8]Nuisance – "An invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land is intentional when the actor (a) acts for the purpose of causing it; or (b) knows that it is resulting or substantially certain to result from his conduct" (Copart Industries, supra, 41 NY2d 564, 571 quoting Restatement, Torts, §825; also see, fn. 6, supra). Trespass – "the trespasser, to be liable, need not intend or expect the damaging consequences of his intrusion, he must intend the act which amounts to or produces the unlawful invasion, and the intrusion must at least be the immediate and inevitable consequence of what he willfully does, or which he does so negligently as to amount to willfullness" (Phillips v Sun Oil Co., 307 NY 328).
[9]The decisions of the Court of Claims since March 2000, for the most part not otherwise published, are available on the court's Internet site –
– and are each designated by a Uniform Identification Number (UID No.) in the form indicated in the above citation.