3. Claimant's "Answer to Motion to Dismiss," dated May 25, 2004, with
attachment.This is Defendant's motion for dismissal of the claim as untimely.
In his underlying claim in this matter, Claimant alleges he was illegally
confined to the Special Housing Unit in Auburn Correctional Facility for a
period of 75 days beginning on April 4, 2003 when he received a Tier III inmate
misbehavior report. He was found guilty in a subsequent disciplinary hearing
and ordered to serve a 45 day penalty. He then received another misbehavior
report on May 13, 2003, was found guilty after a Tier II disciplinary hearing
and received a 30 day penalty on that particular charge. Claimant then availed
himself of the appellate process within the New York State Department of
Corrections on each proceeding. The results of those two appeals are not
relevant to the determination of this motion.
There is no dispute that Claimant served the full term of each penalty. He had
90 days from the date of his release in which to serve a Notice of Intention to
File a Claim or to serve and file a Claim (Henriquez v State of New York
, Ct Cl, April 3, 2003 [Claim No. 106593-A, Motion No. M-66149], Minarik,
J., UID No. 2003-031-015). He filed his claim on April 21, 2004, well beyond 90
days from his release.
Claimant states that
his participation in the appellate process tolled the statute of limitations.
That assertion is false (Emanuele v State of New York
, 43 Misc 2d 135).
There is no tolling of the 90 day statute of limitations. This Court lacks both
subject matter and personal jurisdiction, therefore the claim is
I also note that, even if the claim were filed in a timely manner, it would be
dismissed, nonetheless, for failing to state a cause of action. Although
Claimant alleges in conclusory fashion that his due process rights were violated
during the hearings, he cites no specific shortcoming upon which an action for
illegal confinement can be based. Claimant implicitly equates the success of
his appeals regarding the hearings with his right to recover in this action.
However, the actions of prison personnel involving inmate disciplinary matters
are generally quasi-judicial and, unless they exceed the scope of their
authority or violate applicable rules, are afforded absolute immunity
(Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212; Davis v State of New
York, 262 AD2d 887, lv denied 93 NY2d 819). The fact that the
disposition from a disciplinary hearing is later reversed does not necessarily
remove the matter from the blanket of immunity (Arteaga v State of New
York, supra; Bonacorsa v State of New York, Ct Cl, May 31,
1994 [Claim No. 86522], Bell, J.). There is no indication in the claim that
Defendant violated any of its own rules and regulations in conducting either
hearing, or that it otherwise acted outside the sphere of privileged actions
(Arteaga v State of New York, supra; Holloway v State of New
York, 2001 WL 777553 (3d Dept 2001); cf. Gittens v State of New
York, 132 Misc 2d 399 (Ct Cl 1986). Accordingly, I find that the claim
fails to set forth a valid cause of action upon which relief can be granted.
For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby
ORDERED, that Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted.