Each of these claims arise from an incident on April 5, 1999, when State
troopers executed a search warrant at the residence of John L. Doane. Mr. Doane
was arrested and charged with criminal possession of stolen property. On June
14, 1999, all charges against Mr. Doane were dismissed without prejudice,
although a vehicle
was impounded in the
interim between April 5, 1999 through June 14, 1999. Mr. Doane's sister, Dianna
S. Doane, and live-in girlfriend, Tasha R. Mathews Doane, also commenced claims
arising from Mr. Doane's arrest, detainment, and subsequent investigation. By
way of this motion, the State asserts this Court does not have jurisdiction over
portions of the claim of John L. Doane or the claims of Dianna S. Doane and
Tasha R. Mathews Doane, in their entirety, due to the failure of each Claimant
to comply with CCA 10 and 11. The State's corresponding Verified Answers do set
forth, with particularity, these jurisdictional defenses pursuant to CCA 11 (c).
I. John L. Doane: Claim No. 102870; Motion No. M-63044
Mr. Doane's claim alleges false arrest/false imprisonment; malicious
prosecution; slander and defamation; negligence; and property damage to the
vehicle all arising from the aforementioned
Mr. Doane served a Notice of
Intention on the attorney general's office on July 6,
and served and filed his Claim on August
The State argues that all of Mr. Doane's causes of action, except for the
property damage claim, are based on intentional torts rather than negligence and
are thereby subject to the one year limitation period applicable to intentional
torts pursuant to CCA 10 (3-b).
notes that there is no legally cognizable cause of action for negligent
investigation of a crime. (Hernandez v State of New York
, 228 AD2d 902).
As such, the Court agrees with the State's position that Claimant's remedies are
the intentional torts named below.
a) False arrest/false imprisonment
The one-year limitation period within which to commence a cause of action for
false arrest/false imprisonment starts when the confinement ends. (Collins
, 102 AD2d 860; CCA 10 [3-b]). Here, Mr. Doane was arrested and
released on April 5, 1999, which is the date of accrual for this cause of
action. Claimant timely served a Notice of Intention on July 6, 1999, thereby
extending his time to file and serve a claim. As such, in order for the claim
to be timely it must have been filed and served on or before April 5, 2000, but
it was not filed and served until August 8, 2000, more than one-year from the
date of accrual.
Thus, the Court is without
jurisdiction of this Claim to the extent it contains a false arrest/false
imprisonment cause of action.
b) Malicious Prosecution
A claim for malicious prosecution must be commenced within one-year from the
date of accrual, namely when the criminal proceeding is terminated in favor of
the accused. (CCA 10 [3-b]). Here, the charge against Mr. Doane was dismissed
without prejudice on June 14, 1999. Mr. Doane timely served a Notice of
Intention on July 6, 1999, within 90 days from accrual so he had until June 14,
2000 (one year from the date of accrual) to serve and file his claim. Claimant
missed this deadline by not serving and filing his claim until August 8, 2000.
Accordingly, Claimant's cause of action for malicious prosecution must be
dismissed as untimely.
c) Slander and Defamation
Any cause of action for slander or defamation is also considered an intentional
tort and thus is subject to the one-year limitations period. (CCA 10 [3-b]).
No specific date is provided in the claim as the date of accrual for this cause
of action. In this Court's view, the date of accrual is April 5, 1999, at the
earliest, and June 14, 1999, at the latest. In either event, this Claim was not
filed until August 8, 2000, which is more than one year after these dates and,
as such, is untimely and must be dismissed.
d) Property Damage
Finally, the State concedes that this Claim was timely served and filed with
respect to the property damage cause of action. Accordingly, Claim No. 102870
is now simply a claim for property damage, if any, resulting from the seizure of
the vehicle between April 5, 1999 through June 14,
II. Dianna S. Doane: Claim No. 102871; Motion No. M-63044
Ms. Doane alleges negligence, harassment, and property damage by the State in
connection with the aforementioned arrest and investigation of her brother.
More specifically, on April 17 and 18, 1999, Ms. Doane alleges she was pulled
over without cause and interrogated and detained at the State Police barracks
for questioning regarding her brother's case. Whether Ms. Doane's causes of
action are described in terms of negligence or intentional tort, a claim had to
be filed and served within ninety days of accrual, unless a notice of intention
was served within ninety days of accrual. (CCA 10  & [3-b]). The notice
of intention, if any, had to be served personally or by certified mail, return
receipt requested. (CCA 11). Here, Ms. Doane served her Notice of Intention by
express mail on July 16, 1999. It is well-settled that express mail does not
satisfy the mandates of the statute. (Hodge v State of New York, 213
AD2d 766). As such, the Notice of Intention was improperly served. Without a
properly served notice of intention to extend the relevant time periods, Ms.
Doane had to serve and file her claim within ninety days from accrual pursuant
to CAA 10 & 11. Consequently, Ms. Doane's Claim was untimely because it was
not served and filed until August 8, 2000, well beyond the initial ninety day
period. Accordingly, Claim No. 102871 must be dismissed.
III. Tasha R. Mathews Doane: Claim No. 102869; Motion No. M-63044
Ms. Mathews-Doane alleges damages as the result of the negligence of the State
in arresting her boyfriend, John L. Doane, and harassing her in the process
during his arrest on April 5, 1999. Ms. Mathews-Doane served a Notice of
Intention on the attorney general's office on July 6, 1999. Her Claim was
served and filed on August 8, 2000. The State argues that the gravamen of this
claim are the same intentional torts outlined in Mr. Doane's claim, rather than
the stated negligence cause of action. The Court agrees with the State's
analysis that the claims of Ms. Mathews-Doane are more appropriately described
as being grounded upon intentional torts rather than negligence and, as such,
are subject to the one-year period of CCA 10 [3-b]. (Bryden v Wilson Mem.
Hosp., 136 AD2d 843, 844 ["it is the gravamen or essence of the cause of
action which is considered in determining the applicable Statute of Limitations
[citations omitted]"). Consequently, the Claim served and filed on August 8,
2000, more than one year after accrual, was untimely and must be dismissed.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, it is
ORDERED that the State's motion to dismiss, Motion No. M-63044, is GRANTED in
accordance with the foregoing and Claim No. 102870 is DISMISSED IN PART; it is
ORDERED that Claim Nos. 102871 and 102869 are DISMISSED in their entirety.